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Abstract
Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing
with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted
to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent break-
throughs Artificial Intelligence (AI) research applied to Poker have resulted in
novel approximation approaches such as counterfactual regret minimization, that
can successfully deal with large-scale imperfect games. By drawing from these
ideas, this work addresses the problem of arbitrary continuous payoff distribu-
tions. We propose a method, Harsanyi-Counterfactual Regret Minimization, to
solve two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with arbitrary payoff distribution
models. Given a game Γ, using a Harsanyi transformation we generate a new
game Γ# to which we later apply Counterfactual Regret Minimization to obtain
ε-Nash equilibria. We include numerical experiments showing how the method
can be applied to a previously published problem.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Zero-sum games, Stochastic games, Regret
minimization
1. Introduction
In this work, we propose Harsanyi-Counterfactual Regret Minimization (H-
CFR), an alternative approach to approximate ε-Nash equilibria in incomplete
information two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with arbitrary payoff
distributions.
Recent work has concentrated on addressing this problem by using diverse
linear programming (LP) models that set limitations on the generality of the
payoff distributions. Similarly, other research stream proposes models using
fuzzy logic as an alternative(Dwayne Collins and Hu, 2008)(Gao, 2013). We
propose a simpler approach that allows for arbitrary distributions and can be
scaled to large problems.
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Real-life adversarial and strategic situations are usually accompanied by epis-
temic uncertainty. Modeling these scenarios is an important research theme and
multiple approaches have been proposed(Harsanyi, 1973)(Banks and Anderson,
2006). Uncertain payoffs arise because of various reasons in adversarial scenarios,
epistemic uncertainty and lack of common knowledge have been addressed by
many authors in the past(Rass et al., 2017)(Rios Insua et al., 2015)(Banks et al.,
2015).
Harsanyi (1967)Harsanyi provided the classic foundations for incomplete
information games(Myerson, 2004). Although theoretical support is widely
explored, in practice, there are still significant computational challenges to solve
these large incomplete information games.
Large-scale strategic scenarios involving uncertainty result in approximate
models and belief-based payoff functions represented through random variables.
Not only calculating Nash equilibria in these cases is computationally expensive
but also the expected value of imprecise models is unlikely to match reality,
making precise solutions inaccurate in practice. Last but not least, coordination
problems in the case of multiple equilibria are problematic.
The choice between satisficing and optimizing has been long discussed (Zilber-
stein, 1998)(Blau, 1974). Given the complexity and uncertainty involved in many
large-scale strategic games, addressing problems from a satisficing perspective
may be preferable to seeking an optimal but computationally challenging or even
incomputable Nash equilibrium.
Our proposal not only scales to large problems but also allows for payoff
models that are continuous random functions and even correlated functions are
possible. The proposed method can successfully deal with Bayesian games with
continuous type spaces indirectly defined through the proposed payoff random
function.
1.1. Previous work
Normal-form zero-sum perfect information games (deterministic payoffs)
can be effectively solved as minimax linear problems(von Neumann, 1928)(von
Neumann et al., 1944). The case of extensive-form games was initially problematic
given that the corresponding formulation grows exponentially with respect to
the number of states. The usual approach was to convert extensive-form games
to normal-form and then solving the corresponding linear program.
In the nineties, Koller et al. provided an alternative (KMvS algorithm(Koller
et al., 1994)) with much better scaling properties by representing strategies via
realization weights(Koller and Megiddo, 1992). The formulation results in linear
programs are are proportional to the game tree size(von Stengel, 2002). An
excellent review of these methods is provided byvon Stengel (2002).
Dealing with uncertainty also brings its own challenges. Payoff uncertainty
is common in many applications(Wang and Banks, 2011)(Rass et al., 2017)(Lal-
ropuia and Gupta, 2019)(Banks et al., 2015) and introduces additional problems.
For instance, Ravat et al. looked at stochastic Nash-Cournot games (Ravat and
Shanbhag, 2011) instead of the more common deterministic variants. Recent
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research has explored other cases beyond payoffs such as players’ strategies
subject to stochastic constraints(Singh and Lisser, 2019).
An initial classic approach to handle random payoffs is to solve a game
that uses only the corresponding expected values(Pat-Cornell and Guikema,
2002). However, as argued by many authors, this is not always adequate (Cheng
et al., 2016)(Singh and Lisser, 2018)(Banks et al., 2015)(Singh and Lisser, 2018).
Harsanyi introduced the concept of disturbed games (Harsanyi, 1973) where
players’ uncertainty of the exact payoff values is modeled by introducing random
perturbations. One of the arguments against using expected values is that
information on variability and uncertainty is not available to stakeholders that
would like to assess the risk of certain strategies (Singh and Lisser, 2018).
A precise equilibrium calculation using the expected value of an uncertain
belief model can be argued as misleading and maintaining information about
uncertainty can inform stakeholders on the stability and robustness of the
proposed solutions.
Classically, a stochastic programming formulation is proposed for the special
case of normal-form games with independent and normally distributed random
variables in the payoff(Bhurjee and Panda, 2017). For discrete distributions,
the formulation results in a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem.
A similar and related problem where payoffs are modeled by closed intervals
is expressed as two linear programs that are solved to find the corresponding
bounds(Bhurjee and Panda, 2017).
In general, most work on stochastic games concentrates on linear program-
ming (LP) based formulations and classic stochastic optimization methods. This
is also the preferred approach for stochastic cooperative games with random
payoffs(Suijs et al., 1999)(Özen et al., 2009)(Uhan, 2015). Even without consid-
ering uncertainty and stochasticity, LP-based methods rapidly hit some limits
as game complexity increases. Even with techniques to find isomorphisms in the
extensive form(Gilpin and Sandholm, 2005), linear models for games such as
Poker rapidly reach computational or memory limits and become intractable.
From a Bayesian game perspective, games with random payoff functions
can be restructured and modeled through a probability distribution over a
continuous player type space. However, in practice this is not as simple as it
seems. Rabinovich proposed an approach based on fictitious-play(Brown, 1951)
to solve one-shot symmetric games with continuous single-dimensional types
where utilities must be independent from adversary types(Rabinovich et al.,
2013).
Our work addresses Bayesian games with continuous types arising from
epistemic uncertainty by exploiting some of the recent advances in Poker research
and extrapolating them to other applications. In particular, we explore the
problem of arbitrary continuous payoff distributions in two-player zero-sum
extensive-form games.
1.2. Poker and Artificial Intelligence
Large-scale perfect information games have been a long standing challenge
for Artificial Intelligence research. Recent advances have resulted in superhuman
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performance in chess, shogi, and Go(Silver et al., 2018).
Unlike perfect information games, the strategic implications of information
asymmetry significantly increases complexity. For this reason, imperfect informa-
tion games have received attention, and recent developments have concentrated
on real-life variations of Poker, a challenging large-scale problem. Linear models
have been conventionally used: most poker agents in the first Computer Poker
Competition (2007) used LP formulations and packages(Waugh and Bagnell,
2014).
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) has been a breakthrough in the
effort to solve larger games(Zinkevich et al., 2008)(Sandholm, 2015). Progress
has been exciting in the last few years. Heads-up limit hold’em (HULHE), an
imperfect information game with 3.19 · 1014 decision points, has been weakly-
solved(Bowling et al., 2015). Moreover, algorithms for Heads-up no-limit hold’em
(HUNL), a more challenging variant with more than 10160 decision points, have
achieved superhuman performance(Moravčík et al., 2017)(Brown and Sandholm,
2018b) beating professional players with statistical significance.
Since CFR was proposed, its success has resulted in derivative work improving
and building upon this idea. In particular, variants such as MCCFR (Lanctot,
2013), CFR+(Tammelin, 2014), or LCFR/DCFR (Brown and Sandholm, 2018a)
have been progressively achieving better results. Another interesting line of
research has focused on combining CFR with function approximation techniques
such as neural networks (Brown et al., 2018)(Li et al., 2018) to reduce even
further the memory requirements of large game trees.
In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we will limit the discussion to the
most basic CFR formulation, typically referred to as Vanilla CFR. Nevertheless,
we expect our contribution to be easily extended to newer developments in the
CFR research agenda.
2. Background
The following section introduces two-player games of imperfect information
and discusses ε-Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we provide a short introduction
on regret matching and counterfactual regret minimization. We also introduce
definitions and notation adapted from Shoham (2008), Zinkevich et al. (2008),
Lanctot (2013), and Gibson (2014).
2.1. Imperfect information games (extensive-form)
A two-player zero-sum extensive-form game of imperfect information Γ is de-
fined by a tuple (N ,A,H,Z, A, P, s, u, I) (Shoham, 2008)(Gibson, 2014) where:
N = {1, 2} set of players
A set of actions
H set of non-terminal histories
Z set of terminal histories
A : H → 2A available actions function
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P : H → N player function that assigns turns
s : H×A → H ∪Z successor function, game tree
u : N ×Z → R utility function
I : (I1, I2) a tuple of information partitions
For zero-sum games, u1(z) = −u2(z) for any given terminal state z. If a game
involves chance, a third special player N — typically referred to as Nature —
should be considered and N = {1, 2} ∪N.
Histories h ∈ H ∪ Z are sequences of actions. All histories start with ∅
(empty history). The game finishes at terminal histories z ∈ Z that have no
available actions, and payoffs are awarded at this point. The prefix relation
between histories is denoted with h v h′ and indicates that it is possible to
obtain h′ by adding actions to the sequence h. Lastly, the subset of histories
where i makes decisions is Hi = {h ∈ H|P (h) = i}(Gibson, 2014).
There are states where player i lacks the data to recognize the difference
between two independent histories. This is represented by the information parti-
tion Ii that partitions Hi into information sets Ii,k. To denote that information
set I is a prefix of h, we will use I v h. We also use ZI for the subset of terminal
histories z ∈ Z where I v z.
The strategy that player i ∈ N follows is denoted by σi(a|Ii,k) : Ii×A → [0, 1]
that assigns a probability to each action a given an information set Ii,k. Given
an action, the successor function s is applied resulting in a new state. This
repeats until the game reaches a terminal state z. A strategy profile σ is a tuple
of the strategies of all players. We indicate player i with a subscript i, and we
use −i to indicate all players except i. Also σI 7→a denotes a strategy identical to
σ except from I where σ(a|I) = 1.
Given a history h, the active player at that point is P (h), and the corre-
sponding strategy can be expressed as σ(h) = σP (h)(h). When all players follow
σ, the probability of history h is given by its reachability :
piσ(h) =
∏
s(x,a)@h
σ(a|x) (1)
This can be extended to information sets:
piσ(I) =
∑
h∈I
piσ(h) (2)
The expected payoff strategy σ is:
ui(σ) = Eσui(z) =
∑
z∈Z
piσ(z) ui(z) (3)
Players try to maximize their expected utility by adjusting their strategies.
An ε-Nash generalizes Nash equilibrium. In this case, given other players’
strategies, player i can only improve its payoff by a small value ε. We will refer
to Nash-equilibrium strategies as σ∗, and equally, we will use σ∗ε for ε-Nash.
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For an ε = 0, the definition reduces to a classical Nash equilibrium. This can be
formally expressed as:
ui(σ) + ε ≥ max
σ′i
ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) ∀i ∈ N (4)
Along this work, perfect recall is assumed, i.e., players remember complete
histories making them equivalent to states. This assumption helps to maintain
our presentation simple. Nevertheless, recent research has explored and analyzed
convergence bound guarantees to a wider set of games that do not require this
assumption (Gibson, 2014). We plan to consider these ideas in future research.
2.2. Regret matching
Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) proposed regret matching (RM) as a way to
minimize cumulative regret for normal-form games. As players iteratively try
to learn an optimal strategy, they may try different strategies σt over time
1 ≤ t ≤ T . At any t, if player i could replace all its previous strategies with
some optimal σ∗ti , the corresponding cumulative regret would be:
Rti = max
σ∗ti
n∑
k=1
[
ui(σ
∗t
i , σ
k
−i)− ui(σk)
]
(5)
similarly, this can also be defined at the action level:
Rti(a) =
n∑
k=1
[
ui(a, σ
k
−i)− ui(σk)
]
(6)
that is, regretting not choosing a fixed action a instead of the corresponding σki
used in the past.
The method iteratively approximates correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974),
and in the particular case of constant-sum games, the resulting strategies coincide
with an ε-Nash equilibrium (Lanctot, 2013)(Gibson, 2013). Regret matching
tracks the current cumulative regret Rti(a) for each action a and uses a simple
update rule for strategies. We will denote x+ = max{x, 0} to truncate negative
values, and similarly, we will use Rt,+i (a) to truncate negative regrets to zero.
At each iteration t, strategies are updated using:
σt+1i (a) =
Rt,+i (a)∑
xR
t,+
i (x)
(7)
When the denominator Rt,+i (a) = 0, the classic approach (Zinkevich et al., 2008)
is to use σt+1i (a) = |A|−1 (uniform distribution over actions), however, recent
work (Brown et al., 2018) opts for selecting the action with the highest Rt,+i .
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2.3. Counterfactual regret minimization
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2008)(Gibson,
2014) is an anytime learning algorithm that through iterative self-play approxi-
mates ε-Nash equilibrium and extends to two-player zero-sum extensive-form
games.
A significant advantage is that regret minimization is done at each informa-
tion set instead of at each state. The algorithm can traverse the game using
the successor function s and does not require storing the game tree, instead,
information must be kept only for information sets so memory requirements are
the order of O(
∑
i |Ii|)(Lanctot, 2013).
Counterfactual value is the key concept that extends regret to extensive-form
games. This is defined as the expected payoff of information set I taking into
account reachabilities:
vi(I, σ) =
∑
z∈ZI
ui(z) pi
σ
−i(hI,z) pi
σ(z | hI,z) (8)
where we use hI,z to indicate a history that both h ∈ I and h v z. Using the
following definition, the counterfactual regret for the extended form is given by:
rti(I, a) = vi(I, σ
t
I 7→a)− vi(I, σt) (9)
The cumulative counterfactual regret is then:
Rti(I, a) =
t∑
k=1
rti(I, a) (10)
and strategies are updated in a similar fashion as RM (eq. 7) but extended to
information sets:
σt+1i (I, a) =
Rt,+i (I, a)∑
xR
t,+
i (I, x)
(11)
At any point the average strategy σ¯ can be calculated as:
σ¯Ti (I) =
∑t
k=1 pi
σk
i (I) σ
t(I, a)∑t
k=1 pi
σk
i (I)
(12)
In practice, there is no need to keep previous strategies (Gibson, 2014), instead,
a running sum S is kept:
St+1i (I, a) = S
t
i (I, a) + pi
σk
i (I) σ(I, a) (13)
that later can be used to calculate the average strategy by normalizing:
σ¯Ti (I) =
STi (I, a)∑
x∈A(I) S
T
i (I, x)
(14)
Vanilla CFR does not make any particular consideration for chance nodes
(Algorithm 1), and in each iteration all information sets and applicable actions
are explored.
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Algorithm 1: Vanilla CFR (adapted from Gibson (2014))
1 Initialization:
// set accumulators to zero
2 R(I, a)← 0
3 S(I, a)← 0
// initialize to uniform distribution
4 σ(I, a)← |A|−1
5 for t in 1 . . . T do
6 for i in N do
7 for I in Ii do
8 σ(I, ·)← RegretMatching( R(I, ·) )
9 for a in A(I) do
10 R(I, a)← R(I, a) + vi(I, σI 7→a)− vi(I, σ)
11 S(I, a)← S(I, a) + piσi (I) σi(I, a)
12 end
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 Normalize S(I)
3. Harsanyi-Counterfactual Regret Minimization (H-CFR)
When dealing with strategic conflict, we are interested in allowing for complex
and rich payoff models that can not only be solved but also provide additional
risk related information to stake holders. Instead of formulating the problem as
a linear program, in order to deal with arbitrary payoff models, we transform
the game with a simple modification and proceed to solve it using counterfactual
regret minimization.
The Harsanyi transformation (Harsanyi, 1967) converts an incomplete game
into an imperfect game. Given a game Γ with one or many continuous random
functions P modeling payoffs, we can generate a modified game Γ# by prepending
a single node H as root node where all payoff functions for the complete tree are
sampled. This new root leads to the original root, now representing a very large
information set IΓ where each H outcome results in a complete game tree Γ.
We later apply CFR (Zinkevich et al., 2008) to the modified game Γ#. Instead
of solving several linear programs as Cheng et al. (2016) do, we iteratively
approximate a solution. Our approach allows approximating equilibria for any
arbitrary random function without the restrictions introduced by other classic
stochastic optimization based proposals and can be applied to extensive-form
game when the number of states is large. The number of iterations T for CFR
to find an ε-Nash equilibrium is bounded by O(ε−2) (Lanctot, 2013), however,
the learning process depends on information retrieved by playing the game. For
this reason, it is arguable that different P distributions may affect the required
number of iterations due to sampling issues. Even further, while in a different
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Γ1 Γ∞. . .
IH
Γ
H
Figure 1: Transformation from Γ to Γ#
Algorithm 2: H-CFR:Harsanyi-Counterfactual Regret Minimization
Data: Γ, T
Result: σ∗ε
1 H-Transform:
2 Link H to all nodes z ∈ Z with random variables modeling
uncertainty.
3 Set old root information state IH to Γroot
4 Γ# ← Prepend H to Γroot
5 Solve:
6 σ∗ε ← CFR(Γ#, T )
context, related research (Lanctot, 2013) has analyzed the use of importance
sampling and some of these results could be transferred to this line of research.
We intend to explore them in future research.
3.1. Numerical experiments
3.1.1. Simple routing problem (extensive-form)
As an example, we address the routing problem proposed by Wang and Banks
(2011). A model for a two-player simultaneous game: attacker (A) vs defender
(D). Given a graph such as that in Figure 2, the defender chooses a route from
S to T. The attacker A decides in advance which nodes vi to booby-trap with
an improvised explosive device (IED). The defender’s convoy traverses a route
accumulating damage as it passes nodes that had been selected by the attacker.
The game can be defined for any network and number of IEDs. The analysis is
done from the defender’s perspective that makes a subjective assessment of the
possible damage at each node, summarized in the payoff P.
Original approach. Wang and Banks (2011) solve the given example using
a variation of fictitious play that they denominate adversarial risk analysis
mirroring fixed point (ARA-MFP).
An initial restriction is that their approach requires a normal-form formulation
so all possible valid routes need to be calculated in advance. As a result, Defender
actions ri refer to each of these possible routes. In the example, the number of
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Sv1
T
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
Figure 2: Routing problem, based on Wang and Banks (2011)
routes is actually small but can dramatically increase for other networks:
r1 : S→ v1 → v3 → v5 → v4 → v6 → T
r2 : S→ v1 → v3 → v6 → T
r3 : S→ v2 → v3 → v5 → v4 → v6 → T
r4 : S→ v2 → v3 → v6 → T
(15)
The attacker A can use at most one IED, and the action space is indicated by
the set of nodes or ∅ for no attack. Wang and Banks (2011) model the problem
as a zero-sum game, and matrices define the outcome of each attacker/defender
interaction:
UA = −UD =

r1 r2 r3 r4
∅ 0 0 0 0
v1 U1 U1 0 0
v2 0 0 U2 U2
v3 U3 U3 U3 U3
v4 U4 0 U4 0
v5 U5 0 U5 0
v6 U6 U6 U6 U6

(16)
Our proposal. In H-CFR, it is possible to work directly with the extensive form
of the game so there is no need to convert to a normal form. For each run, we
refer to the set of visited nodes as V, and 1V is the corresponding indicator
function for this set. The payoff at the terminal node T ∈ Z can be then defined
with a simple expression:
uA(T) =
∑
k
Uk · 1V(vk) (17)
As previously described, we transform the game tree Γ into Γ# by prepending a
node H where payoff sampling occurs, and we approximate the ε-Nash equilibrium
using CFR. This can be easily extended to other more advanced CFR variations.
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Table 1: Solutions — Attacker’s strategy (σA(a))
ARA-MFP H-CFR (binomial)
iterations 3598 500
∅ 0.0000 0.0003
v1 0.1241 0.0003
v2 0.1241 0.0011
v3 0.4275 0.5376
v4 0.0001 0.0003
v5 0.0000 0.0005
v6 0.3243 0.4602
Table 2: Payoff models
Model definition
Binomial Ui =Binomial(0.5, 10)
Normal Ui =Normal(5, 1)
Uniform Ui =Uniform(0.5, 10)
Beta Ui =10 ·Beta(0.5, 0.5)
Mixture Ui =Normal(2.5, 1) or Normal(7.5, 1)
Binomial distribution. The original problem models interactions as independent
and equal to Uk = Binomial(10, 0.5). Based on these parameters, Table 1 shows
results obtained for both methods.
Given the specific routing network selected in the example, an infinite number
of equilibria exist for both players. While it could be expectable that our
equilibrium does not match that of Wang, when analyzed in detail, we recognize
that the published result is far from a Nash equilibrium.
Given the network structure, the attacker will always damage the defender by
placing an IED in node v3 or v6. Surprisingly, the solution published by Wang
and Banks (2011) recommends v1 or v2 as part of the strategy, resulting in a
damage probability significantly lower than 1.
Our method (H-CFR) effectively converges to an adequate strategy. Moreover,
we emphasize that the algorithm works directly with the extensive form of the
game and requires minimal changes to the problem definition. Also, much more
interesting payoff models can be used. In particular, we intend to explore games
with payoffs represented as Bayesian networks in future research.
Other distributions. We extend the payoff model to other probability distribu-
tions. Table 2 provides more information on the specific parameters. All models
share the same expected value to simplify comparisons. We apply H-CFR for
500 iterations to each case. The corresponding approximations are shown in
Table 3, and Figure 3 shows the convergence of E[Γσt ] with respect to iterations
t. While simpler models such as Binomial, Uniform, or Normal rapidly approach
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Table 3: Solutions — Attacker’s strategy for different belief models (σA)
(500 iterations)
Binomial Uniform Normal Beta Mixture
∅ 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
v1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 0.0037
v2 0.0011 0.0004 0.0011 0.0014 0.0036
v3 0.5376 0.6646 0.3440 0.9903 0.9847
v4 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
v5 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003
v6 0.4602 0.3339 0.6539 0.0065 0.0071
0 20 40 60 80 100
t (iteration)
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
E[ Γ σ
t
]
Binomial
Uniform
Normal
Beta
Mixture
Figure 3: Expected value convergence for different payoff models
5.0, Beta or Mixture models result in higher variance and require a higher
number of iterations. A general bound for CFR has been proven (Zinkevich
et al., 2008)(Lanctot, 2013) so convergence to an ε-Nash in the limit is ensured.
We experimentally explored the case of a mixture model by running the same
procedure multiple times (n=50). Figure 4 shows sampled extreme, average, and
1 standard error values for each iteration among all runs. The plot shows how
variance reduces over time as the correct strategy is being learned. However, as
the value approaches convergence, there is an intrinsic sampling error due to
the structure of the game. Figure 5 shows how we sample different comparable
equilibria over different runs. In this case, resulting strategies indicate a linear
combination of v3 and v6. These strategies can also be evaluated from a risk
perspective by sampling (Figure 6) to evaluate the probability of achieving
certain minimum payoff.
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0 20 40 60 80 100
t (iteration)
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
E[ Γ σ
t
]
mean
min/max
mean±std.dev.
Figure 4: Expected value convergence for the mixture model
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
v3
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
v 6
Figure 5: Strategy values for v3 and v6 for the mixture model
13
0 2 4 6 8 10
payoff
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
0.150
0.175
de
ns
it
y
Figure 6: Payoff distribution for equilibrium strategy (mixture model)
4. Conclusions
We have proposed H-CFR, an alternative to approach ε-Nash equilibria in
zero-sum extensive-form games where payoff uncertainty can be modeled by
arbitrary distributions. In addition, we have provided numerical examples by
applying the method to previously published models.
The method not only profits from better scalability due to CFR-based
advantages but also requires limited changes in the formulation of the problem.
It can be applied both to normal and extensive forms, it is an anytime algorithm,
and does not constrain the kind of distributions used to model payoff uncertainty.
The current work lays out a series of questions that we plan to consider in
future research. In particular, we would like to explore the effect of different
payoff models over convergence bounds and a better use of sampling techniques
such as importance sampling. Most games will typically have multiple equilibria.
Each H-CFR run converges to a single strategy that depends stochastically
on the sampled payoffs. Figure 5 showed that is possible to sample different
equilibria. We plan to investigate improved approaches to sample the whole
Nash equilibria space. Last but not least, we see the opportunity of applying
this method to more complex Bayesian Network based models.
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